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War-Related and Defense Expenditures
IT is clear that the aggregate statistics of government expenditure change
over time in a fashion that cannot be explained by the permanent in-
fluences affecting expenditures. When such factors have been removed,
the relation between the growth of government expenditure and the
growth of GNP isstill not constant or regular. More particularly, a
chart of real expenditures per head of population has peaks during the
two major wars, separating plateaus at ascending levels. The association
of this displacement in the level of expenditures (and in the proportion
of national output devoted to government use) with war periods invites
examination of the possibility that the rising plateaus are the direct
consequence of the wars themselves. In this chapter, therefore, we shall
examine the possibility that not only the time process of expenditure
growth, but also the growth itself, is the direct result of war and not of
the deliberate wishes of the citizens or the government. This means that
we shall have to discuss war-related expenditures in two distinct contexts.
In this chapter we are interested in the direct importance of the expendi-
tures actually made for such reasons, as an explanation of the phenomenon
of displacement. In the next chapter, where we break down total govern-
ment expenditure into what we believe to be significant categories in
order to examine the development of different kinds of government
activity, we shalL be concerned with the relative changes in expenditures
for war-related purposes compared with changes in government expendi-
tures of other kinds.
Xational Debt Interest and Other War-Related Expenditures
The notion that the growth in British government expenditure is the con-
sequence of war is of course not new. Indeed, throughout British fiscal
history writers have attributed rising government expenditures to war-
related causes, and especially to the growth of interest payments on the
national debt. The last chapter of The Wealth of Nations treats war as
majorand direct cause of changes in the level of government expenditure,'
1SeeAdam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Vol. II, Book V, Chapter 3, "Of Public
Debts" (Cannan edition), London, 1904.
Smith says, for example (p. 418), "That the public revenue of Great Britain can ever
be completely liberated, [i.e., from the burden of debt] or even that any considerable
progress can ever be made towards that liberation, while the surplus of that revenue,
or what is over and above defraying the annual expence of the peace establishment, is
so very small, it seems altogether vain to expect." What Smith had in mind is that govern-
ment expenditure must remain higher alter wars because, given current views of the
tolerable burden of taxation, sufficient revenues cannot be raised to repay the debt
incurred in wartime, so that the debt interest charges become a permanent addition
to government expenditure.
It will be recalled by the American reader that the peacetime burden of pui.dic debt
interest was a major reason why Smith supported taxation of the American colonies—
but taxation with representation!
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and a similar attitude pervades much subsequent writing, at least up to
the time of the Coiwyn Committee in 1927.2 Such a view was encouraged
by the fact that the conventional form of budget statement, on which
these authorities had to rely, exaggerated the importance of government
debt and debt interest. In particular, they included payments of debt
interest by one government agency to others, and such intragovernmental
payments were not inconsiderable. Moreover, the budget statements were
only concerned with the expenditure of the central government and not
with total government expenditure, and excluded the accounts of the
various social insurance schemes. We should expect the significance of
debt in the growth of total expenditures to become less marked when
these matters were taken into account.
Even if we accept the inflated official figures of debt expenditures, we
find that while debt expenditures never became negligible in absolute
size, they declined in importance relative to expenditures of other types
from the end of the Napoleonic Wars onwards. This confirms, for Britain,
the argument of Wagner and other Continental writers whose researches
covered a number of countries, that war debt alone could not serve as a
general explanation of government expenditure growth, at least during
this earlier period.
In Britain during our own period, debt interest payments have become
of smaller relative importance than ever before, although just after
World War I they rose again for a time to almost 30 per cent of total
government expenditure. The evolution can be seen from Tables 3 and
4, but the place of debt interest payments in total government expenditure
is perhaps most easily understood from Charts 8, 9 and 10, which show
what happens to the curve of government expenditure, and its relation
to national income, when national debt interest and other war-related
expenditures are omitted.3 The curve of government expenditure less
debt interest shows a displacement at the same periods as total expen-
ditures, whether we use statistics of total money expenditures or of real
expenditures per head. Thus, this residual curve starts at a much higher
"real" level after 1918 (Chart 9), declines at a faster rate than the total
expenditure curve up to 1923, and thereafter follows a more quickly
rising trend than total expenditure up to 1939. This is the result of the
2See,for example, C. F. Bastable, Public Finance, 3rd ed., London, 1903, pp. 70—72;
J. Stuart Mill, Principles of Public Economy (Ashley edition), London, 1909, Book 5, Chapter
7, pp. 788—880; and the Coiwyn Committee Report on National Debt and Taxation, H.M.S.O.,
Command Paper 2800, 1927. For an interesting review of that committee's views on
debt burdens, see alsoJ. M. Keynes, Economic Journal, June 1927, pp. 208—2 12.
3Itwill be noted that only the total government expenditure curve is complete for
the war years; the peaks are omitted in the residual curves because no very satisfactory
breakdown of the wartime expenditure statistics is possible (see Appendix, "Central
Government," p. 162). However, this does not preclude using the charts for information
about the plateaus.
53CHART 8
Total Government Expenditure and Its War-Related and Defense
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CHART9
Total Government Expenditure and Its War-Related and Defense
Components, in Relation to Gross National Product, per Head of
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heavy burden of debt interest after 1918 resulting from the debt policies
of World War I, the significance of debt being greatest around 1924, then
reducing gradually up to around 1934, and more rapidly thereafter as a
result of the debt conversion operations of 1932 and 1934 (see Tables 3
and 4 and A-7 to A-b). While, therefore, the curve fluctuates somewhat
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more than that for total expenditures, the residual expenditures never
approach their earlier level after 1918, and describe a rough plateau at
the new higher level over the period of the interwar years.
CHART 10
Indexes of Total Government Expenditure and Its War-Related
and Defense Components, in Relation to Gross National Product,














The upward shift in the plateau is even more striking after 1945, and
the sympathetic movement of the total expenditure curve and the curve
of expenditures excluding debt interest is much more marked. This must
be attributed first to wartime debt policy, which led to a much smaller
increase (in real terms) in the size of debt during World War II than
during World War I, second to the postwar "Dalton era" of cheap money
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the postwar inflation which has reduced the real significance of payments
fixed in money terms. In relation to national income, the removal of
debt interest must of course reduce the share of expenditures in total
income, but the trend of that share is still an increasing one, as the
residual grows much faster over the period than does GNP. The respective
rates of growth can be seen from Table 4, by comparing the changes in
GNP index and the "residual" indexes, and (perhaps more easily) from
Chart 10, which plots indexes (1900 =100)of GNP, government expendi-
ture, and so on, per head at 1900 prices on a log scale. The increasing
share of government expenditure less national debt is clearly shown by
the rises in the relevant curve as compared with the curve of GNP per
head, and the association of change with war is demonstrated by the
fact that it is after the wars that the distance between the two curves
widens.4
However, national debt interest is not the only type of war-related
expenditure. Governments also incur obligations through war for such
items as war pensions and war damage compensation. Could not the
aggregation of these three items account for the time pattern that we
are trying to explain? The magnitude of these other war-related expendi-
tures can be seen from the tables, and their influence upon the displace-
ment effect is brought out by the charts, which include a curve of total
government expenditure excluding war pensions and war damage com-
pensation as well as debt interest payments.5 In fact, these additional
items are relatively insignificant; the curve of expenditures excluding
them differs little from the curve excluding debt interest only. All the
conclusions reached by examination of the latter curve thus continue to
hold; specifically, the displacement effect still appears in the new residual
curve.
Defense Expenditure
There remains a further problem. The expenditures discussed so far are
in a direct fashion the consequences of war. They take no account of
expenditure upon war itself, or of peacetime military expenditures for
the defense of the realm. It is very difficult to distinguish military and
other types of government expenditures in wartime, and even more
difficult to distinguish, even conceptually, between military spending
The relation between the index of GNP and the indexes of government expenditure
in the period before 1914 may perhaps require elucidation. The base year, 1900, is in
the period of the South African War, so that some decline in government expenditures
is to be expected in the following years of peace. Also, as explained earlier, the statistics
for this period are at five-year intervals only; the divergencies between the curves would
probably be smaller if annual data were available.
No statistics for these other war-related expenditures were computed for the period
before 1914. There is no reason to believe, however, that they were any more significant
then than in later years.
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concerned specifically with the prosecution of war and other kinds of
defense spending which occur in both war and peace. Fortunately, our
interest is in the influence of war upon peacetime government activities
rather than in the detailed composition of actual government expenditures
in wartime; for study of the displacement effect we can therefore con-
centrate our attention upon peacetime defense spending. Even so, the
appropriate interpretation of defense expenditures in relation to the
displacement effect is not easily decided. From one point of view, there
are strong arguments for treating all defense spending as being exo-
genously determined in a sense that other government expenditures are
not. The size of such expenditures clearly depends to an important
extent upon world political conditions and upon the government's inter-
pretation of its own security needs in the light of those conditions.6
it could be argued that influences (such as views about
tolerable levels of taxation) that might be significant in determining the
level of expenditures of other kinds would have much less direct effect
on the level of defense spending. To the extent that this is so, any displace-
ment effect of war on government expenditures in general would show
more clearly if we eliminated both defense spending and more directly
war-related expenditures from total spending, and studied the behavior
of the residual.
On the other hand, peacetime defense expenditure clearly does not
lie as completely outside the influences that affect expenditures of other
types as do wartime military expenditure and other war-related expendi-
tures. Politicians try to take account of the financial of
proposals for defense policy, rather than simply accepting the views of
military experts. In Peel's words: "If you adopt the opinion of military
men, we are never safe."7 Like all other expenditure, defense spending
requires the raising of revenues, and the governments of many countries
(including Britain) are answerable to the electorate for defense spending.
Even if it is accepted that increases in defense expenditure are less easy
to control in such ways than expenditures of other types, nevertheless,
peacetime expenditure on defense constitutes a part of the total tax
burden that the community is called on to bear. From this point of view
defense expenditure is no different from any other expenditure; it is the
total that is of prime importance to a government. Hence, acceptance of
the need to spend more on defense in peacetime may result not (or not
only) in changes in the total of government spending, but rather i.n
6Thisinterpretation will itself not be independent of a country's economic develop-
ment. The richer a country, the more it may become an object of envy and greed and
the more liable it will be to attack if not adequately protected.
Quoted in D. H. MacGregor, Public Aspects of Finance, Oxford, 1939, p. 34, in a dis-
cussion of these questions, pp. 33—35.
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reductions in expenditures of other types. Conversely, it can be argued
that if in any peacetime period defense expenditures had been smaller,
the likely result would have been increased spending of other kinds rather
than (or as well as) reduced total spending, given existing notions as to
the tolerable burden of taxation. It is probable, therefore, that in elimin-
ating all defense expenditures we are eliminating altogether too much if
we want the residual to reflect what government expenditures "would
have been" in the absence of such spending.
Unlike the other war-related expenditures, defense expenditures are
by no means negligible, as can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 and from the
Appendix tables. In many years, indeed, defense spending has been
larger than all other expenditures for war-related purposes, and for a
number of years after World War II it was around twice the size of these
other items. The charts show the results of eliminating defense expendi-
tures as well as the other types of war-related spending from the global
statistics of government expenditures. The new residual expenditures still
show a displacement in periods of war (lowest curve, Charts 8 and 9),
and the peacetime expenditure plateaus do not show any more marked
fluctuations. Of course, the time pattern of those fluctuations is now
different; there is no reason why defense spending and military expendi-
ture of other types should change in any closely connected fashion in
peacetime, and it is clear from the tables that they have not done so. It
is also clear from the GNP and residual expenditure indexes in Chart 10
that the residual still takes an increasing share of GNP over our period
as a whole, and that changes in this share are roughly associated with
periods of war.
The cumulative evidence seems to justify the conclusion that the
characteristic time pattern of government expenditures is not solely the
accidental consequence of wars. Some further explanation is therefore
needed, to be found by more detailed examination of the changes that
have occurred in the nature of peacetime government expenditures, to
which we now turn.
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